This is Post 1 of 16 in the Taiwan Risk Series — a framework developed for a client and adapted for educational purposes with their permission.

A note on methodology: this framework was first developed for a client engagement that began several years ago. Some of the contextual framing has been updated and reformulated for educational purposes and public readability. The underlying analytical structure and KPI thresholds reflect the current state of intelligence as of May 2026.

One of our clients runs an e-commerce business whose supply chain, pricing model, and margins are directly sensitive to Chinese foreign policy. Not as an abstract geopolitical risk — as a live operational variable.

They asked Polaris to build a strategic risk dashboard for the Taiwan Strait. After delivering the full work, they allowed us to share part of the framework publicly for educational purposes.

The result is a 16-post series. Ten KPIs with traffic-light thresholds to monitor when cross-strait tension moves from coercion to military action. Six posts on the consequences if it does.

This is not geopolitical commentary. It is applied strategic intelligence — the kind any business with exposure to Asia-Pacific supply chains, semiconductor-dependent products, or Chinese market revenues should be doing right now.

Overall dashboard reading, May 2026: 🟡 Amber. Four KPIs amber, one red, five green.

We start with the most fundamental question.

KPI #1 — Can China Actually Cross the Water?

The Amphibious Lift Problem

What it measures: How many troops China can deploy in a single wave across the Taiwan Strait.

Taiwan is 180 kilometres from the Chinese mainland at its narrowest crossing point. It is mountainous, heavily defended, and — if US intervention materialises — contested by one of the world’s most capable naval forces. A credible invasion requires not just military will but the physical capacity to move a large enough force across open water under fire, fast enough to overwhelm defences before a counter-response can consolidate.

Current estimates from RAND put PLA amphibious lift capacity at approximately 50,000 troops per wave. Military analysts broadly agree that a viable forced-entry operation requires at least 150,000–200,000 per wave. China is not there yet.

Current status: 🟢 Green. Capacity remains well below the threshold required for a viable amphibious assault. This is the most structurally constraining of all ten KPIs — and the one that buys the most time.

📍 Next in the series

KPI #2 — When a General Gets Purged, Pay Attention. Three waves of senior PLA leadership removals in three years. What it signals — and why the short-term and medium-term readings point in opposite directions.

⚡ The consequence to watch

If this KPI moves to amber, the global lead time before a viable military option exists compresses from years to months. The consequence that activates first: semiconductor supply chain disruption — 90% of the world’s advanced chips on one island, with no alternative production at scale.

🔧 The drill

Map your top 10 suppliers. For each one, answer: does this supplier use chips manufactured in Taiwan? If you don’t know the answer, that is your first action item.

Source: RAND Corporation, “Chinese Amphibious Warfare: Prospects for a Cross-Strait Invasion” (2024). Full series index: polarismng.com